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Abstract
We solve the principal-agent problem of a monopolist insurer selling to an agent
whose riskiness (chance of a loss) is private information, a problem introduced in
Stiglitz (1977)'s seminal paper.
We derive several properties of optimal menus for an arbitrary type distrib-
ution: the highest type gets full coverage (e±ciency at the top), all other types
get less than full coverage (downward distortions elsewhere), the premium and
indemnity are nonnegative and the principal makes positive expected pro¯t. More
importantly, we prove a novel comparative static result for wealth e®ects, showing
that the principal always prefers an agent facing a larger loss, and a poorer one if
the agent's risk aversion decreases with wealth.
We then specialize to the case with a continuum of types distributed according
to an smooth density. We give su±cient conditions for complete sorting, exclu-
sion, and quantity discounts. Our most surprising result is that, under two mild
assumptions{the monotone likelihood ratio property for the density and decreasing
absolute risk aversion for the agent{the optimal premium is backwards-S shaped
in the amount of coverage, ¯rst concave, then convex.
We contrast our results with the standard monopoly model with private values
and quasilinear preferences and with competitive insurance models. We calculate
a closed form solution for the CARA case and use it to illustrate these di®erences.
Although we focus on the monopoly insurance problem, our proofs can be
adapted to other screening problems with wealth e®ects and common values.
Keywords: Principal-Agent Model, Monopoly Insurance, Adverse Selection, Com-
mon Values, Wealth E®ects, Quantity Discounts and Premia.
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Moral hazard and adverse selection are fundamental problems in insurance. A large
literature has explored how each a®ects insurance contracts in competitive or monopoly
markets. The usual approach for moral hazard has been the principal-agent model
(which includes the case of monopoly).1 The usual approach for adverse selection has
been competitive models, either the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model or one of its
variants. An exception is Stiglitz (1977), who introduces a model of a monopolist insurer
selling to an insuree who is privately informed about the chance of a loss. He solves the
case of two types of insurees using an intuitive graphical argument, and derives a few
properties of optimal insurance with a continuum of types. Still, we know surprisingly
little about monopoly insurance policies, even for the case of a ¯nite number of types or
continuum-type case with a continuous density.
We solve the problem of a monopolist insurer selling to a risk averse agent (the
insuree) who is privately informed about the chance of su®ering a loss. The monopoly
insurance problem does not ¯t the standard principal-agent model of a monopolist selling
to a privately informed consumer (e.g., Maskin and Riley (1984)) for three reasons:
the agent's risk aversion implies that there are wealth e®ects (except for the constant
absolute risk aversion case, henceforth CARA); the agent's type enters the principal's
objective function directly (common values); and the agent's reservation utility is type
dependent. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ¯rst to provide a complete solution
to a principal-agent problem with all these properties.
We divide the paper into two parts. In the ¯rst we allow an arbitrary type distri-
bution, imposing neither a ¯nite support nor a continuous density function. Despite
the generality we extend all of the known results for the two-type case, and add others:
the type with the highest chance of a loss gets full coverage (e±ciency at the top); all
other types get less than full coverage (downward distortions elsewhere); the premium
and coverage are nonnegative for all types and co-monotone; and the principal makes
positive expected pro¯t (there are always gains to trade).
As just mentioned, one crucial di®erence with the standard monopoly model is that
the agent's wealth matters. An important question is how the agent's initial wealth and
1Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Chiappori and Bernardo (2003) are exceptions.
1the loss size a®ect the principal's pro¯t. Using monotone methods, we prove a novel
comparative static result showing that the principal always prefers an agent facing a
larger loss, and prefers a poorer one if the agent's risk aversion decreases with wealth.
In the second part of the paper we specialize to the case of a continuum of types
distributed according to a smooth density. We derive conditions for complete sorting of
types, exclusion (or inclusion) of types, and quantity discounts. Wealth e®ects prevent
us from bypassing optimal control arguments, as is usually done in the quasilinear case.
Our most surprising result is on the curvature of the optimal premium as a function
of the coverage amount: under two mild assumptions{the density satis¯es the monotone
likelihood ratio property and the agent's risk aversion decreases with wealth{the pre-
mium is backwards S-shaped, ¯rst concave, then convex. The curvature property sharply
distinguishes a monopoly insurance policy from one o®ered by a `standard' (i.e., Maskin-
Riley) monopolist and from competitive insurance policies. In particular, monopoly in-
surers do not o®er global quantity premia, an implication of many competitive insurance
models (e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)).
We calculate a closed-form solution in the CARA case, and use it to illustrate some
properties peculiar to the insurance problem. We show that there is partial insurance
at the top if the highest type su®ers a loss for sure; that monotonicity of the hazard
rate does not su±ce for complete sorting; and that common values precludes a globally
concave premium schedule (unless the type space is severely restricted).
Our emphasis is almost exclusively on the monopoly insurance problem. We point
out, however, that several of the proofs can be adapted to other principal-agent problems
with adverse selection, wealth e®ects, and common values. We hope that our arguments
will be helpful in more general principal-agent problems with these features.
Related Literature. The paper is closely related to three literatures. First, it is re-
lated to the insurance with adverse selection literature started by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) for competition, and Stiglitz (1977) for monopoly; each focuses on the two-type
case.2 We completely solve a more general problem than does Stiglitz (1977), and we
2The renegotiation stage in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) can be interpreted as a monopoly insurance
problem, in which the (random) e®ort chosen in the ¯rst stage is the agent's type. With a continuum of
e®orts, they derive an optimality condition similar to ours in Section 4. But they mainly use it to ¯nd
the support of the equilibrium e®ort distribution, and do not explore sorting, exclusion, or curvature.
2compare the predictions of monopoly and competition. A large literature tests impli-
cations of the joint hypothesis of adverse selection and (some version of) competition
(e.g., Chiappori, Jullien, Salani¶ e, and Salani¶ e (2006) and Cawley and Philipson (1999));
our results help separate implications of adverse selection from competition.3 Second,
it is related to the literature on principal-agent models with adverse selection, illus-
trated by Spence (1977), Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984), Matthews
and Moore (1987), Jullien (2000), Hellwig (2006), and NÄ oldeke and Samuelson (2007).
The complications of the insurance problem{wealth e®ects, common values, and type-
dependent reservation utilities{are absent in Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley
(1984), and Matthews and Moore (1987).4 Jullien (2000) emphasizes type-dependent
reservation utility, and NÄ oldeke and Samuelson (2007) allow for common values, but each
imposes quasilinear preferences (and focuses on particular aspects of the solution). Hell-
wig (2006) derives the standard no-pooling and e±ciency-at-the-top results in a general
principal-agent problem with wealth e®ects, using a nontrivial extension of the Maxi-
mum Principle. We handle the insurance problem with a general type distribution using
elementary arguments. Finally, the paper is related to Thiele and Wambach (1999), who
determine how an agent's wealth a®ects the principal's pro¯t in the moral hazard case.
In our adverse selection problem we are able to do so with weaker assumptions.
2 The Model
We model the monopolist's choice of insurance policies as a principal-agent problem with
adverse selection. The agent (insuree) has initial wealth of w > 0, faces a potential loss
of ` 2 (0;w) with chance µ 2 (0;1), and has risk preferences represented by a strictly
increasing and strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(¢) on R+.
3Cohen and Einav (2007) estimate the demand for insurance for a new entrant into the Israeli
automobile insurance market. They argue that this ¯rm has market power, and that a monopoly
insurance model describes their data better than a competitive one does.
4 Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000), Section 4, consider a risk neutral monopoly `market maker'
who trades a risky asset with a risk averse investor who has CARA utility and private information about
the asset's mean return and his endowment. The risk neutral market maker can be viewed as an insurer
and the investor as an insuree, with the private information about the mean return as information
about the mean loss in an insurance setting (rather than the probability of a loss). But the di®erence
in the de¯nition of a type leads to completely di®erent conditions for separation and curvature.
3The loss chance µ, from now on the agent's type, is private information to the agent.
The principal (monopolist insurer) is risk neutral, with beliefs about the agent's type
given by a cumulative distribution function F(¢) with support £ ½ (0;1).5 Let µ and
µ be the smallest and largest elements of £; by assumption 0 < µ < µ < 1. This
formulation includes the discrete case with a ¯nite number of types, the continuum of
types case with an atomless density function, and mixtures of both.
The principal chooses, for each µ 2 £, a contract (x;t) 2 R consisting of a premium t
and an indemnity payment x in the event of a loss. The expected pro¯t from a contract
(x;t) chosen by a type-µ agent is ¼(x;t;µ) = t ¡ µx, and the ex-ante expected pro¯t
from a (measurable) menu of contracts (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ is
R
£ ¼(x(µ);t(µ);µ)dF(µ).
The expected utility of type-µ agent for a contract (x;t) is µ is U(x;t;µ) = µu(w ¡
` + x ¡ t) + (1 ¡ µ)u(w ¡ t). The function U satis¯es the following single crossing
property: for any two distinct contracts (x0;t0) and (x;t) with (x0;t0) ¸ (x;t) and µ0 > µ,
if U(x0;t0;µ) ¸ U(x;t;µ) then U(x0;t0;µ0) > U(x;t;µ0). If u(¢) is di®erentiable, this is
equivalent to ¡Ux(x;t;µ)=Ut(x;t;µ) strictly increasing in µ; i.e., indi®erence curves cross
once, with higher types being willing to pay more for a marginal increase in insurance.
By the Revelation Principle, we restrict attention to (measurable) menus (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£
for which the agent chooses to participate and to announce its true type µ. Formally,







U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) ¸ U(0;0;µ) 8µ 2 £ (P)
U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) ¸ U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ) 8µ;µ0 2 £. (IC)
It is instructive to compare this problem with the standard monopoly problem (e.g.,
Maskin and Riley (1984)). In the standard problem, the agent has quasilinear utility, her
type does not directly a®ect the principal's pro¯t, and it does not enter her reservation
5The suppport of a probability measure on the real line (endowed with the Borel ¾-¯eld) is the
smallest closed set with probability one. Formally, £ = fµ 2 (0;1) j F(µ+")¡F(µ¡") > 0; 8 " > 0g.
4utility. Here, the agent is risk averse, implying nontrivial wealth e®ects (except for the
case of CARA preferences); the agent's reservation utility depends on the type; and the
agent's type a®ects the principal's pro¯t directly, i.e., it is a common values model.
The common values aspect leads to an important distinction. In the standard
monopoly model, pro¯t is increasing in type both under complete (¯rst-best) and in-
complete information. In our model, however, ¯rst-best pro¯t is not increasing in type
(higher types demand more insurance but the cost of selling to them is higher). Indeed,
¯rst-best pro¯t from a type equals that type's risk premium, which is concave in the
agent's type, ¯rst increasing, then decreasing. Moreover, under incomplete information
pro¯t from the highest type can easily be negative, implying that the principal does not
o®er quantity discounts for high coverage, as we explain in Section 5.
3 The General Case: Arbitrary Type Distribution
We begin with some general properties of optimal menus, and determine how the agent's
wealth a®ects the principal's pro¯t. We emphasize that these results hold for an arbitrary
type set £ ½ (0;1) and a general cumulative distribution function on it.
3.1 A Useful Lemma
Consider a contract that does not give full coverage. Now change the indemnity in the
direction of (but not beyond) full coverage and adjust the premium so that expected
utility of a type falls. Then the principal's pro¯t from that type increases. We repeatedly
use this result to ¯nd improvements to a given menu.
Lemma 1 (Pro¯table Changes) Let µ 2 £, and let jx00 ¡ `j < jx0 ¡ `j with
(x00 ¡ `)(x0 ¡ `) ¸ 0. If U(x00;t00;µ) · U(x0;t0;µ), then ¼(x00;t00;µ) > ¼(x0;t0;µ).
Proof. Fix µ 2 £. Since the agent is strictly risk averse and U(x0;t0;µ) ¸ U(x00;t00;µ), it
follows that t00 ¡ t0 > µ(x00 ¡ x0); for otherwise the consumption plan generated by the
(x00;t00) would second-order stochastically dominate the plan generated by (x0;t0) and
the agent would strictly prefer (x00;t00) to (x0;t0). Thus, t00 ¡ µx00 > t0 ¡ µx0. ¥
5Intuitively, if a change from a given contract o®ers more insurance and yet makes the
agent worse o®, then the additional insurance must be `actuarially unfair.' But then the
change increases expected pro¯t.
3.2 Properties of Optimal Menus
We now list several properties of optimal menus for an arbitrary type distribution.
Theorem 1 (Properties of an Optimal Menu) Any solution (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ to the
principal's problem satis¯es the following properties:
(i) (Monotonicity) x(µ), t(µ), and x(µ) ¡ t(µ) are increasing in µ;
(ii) (No Overinsurance) x(µ) · ` for almost all µ;
(iii) (Nonnegativity) x(µ), t(µ), and x(µ) ¡ t(µ) are nonnegative for almost all µ;
(iv) (Participation) (P) is binding for the lowest type µ ;
(v) (E±ciency at the Top) Without loss of generality, x(µ) = `;
(vi) (No Pooling at the Top) If u is di®erentiable, then x(µ) < ` for almost all µ < µ;
(vii) (Pro¯tability) The principal's expected pro¯t is positive.
Proof. Appendix. ¥
The proof has many steps, but except for a few measure-theoretic details, each is elemen-
tary. Result (i) follows immediately from incentive compatibility and the single-crossing
property. We prove results (ii) and (iii) by contraposition: we use Lemma 1 to show
that if a menu does not satisfy either property, then there is another feasible menu that
increases pro¯t for a positive mass of agents. We prove (v) and (vi) similarly. For (iv),
we show that if this property fails, the principal can feasibly reduce the utility of each
type in each state by the same amount and hence increase expected pro¯t. Finally, we
prove (vii) by showing that there is a pooling contract that is accepted by a positive
mass of high enough types and yields positive expected pro¯t.
Stiglitz derives properties (i) and (iv)-(vi) for the two-type case. In independent
work, Hellwig (2006) proves properties (v) and (vi) for an optimal tax problem with
adverse selection with a general type distribution. His proofs use ¯rst-order conditions
from an optimal control problem (where much of the contribution is to extend the ¯rst
6order conditions to allow for discontinuous densities). Theorem 1 also shows that an
optimal menu is nonnegative (property (iii)), and that there are always gains to trade
(property (vii)). We prove these properties for a general type distribution using fairly
elementary arguments, repeatedly invoking Lemma 1 to ¯nd pro¯table deviations from
a menu that fails one of these properties. We argue in Section 5 that the arguments
can be adapted to the standard monopoly pricing model with quasilinear utility (with
or without common values), and doubtless similar arguments can be used in a more
general principal-agent problem.
3.3 The Principal Prefers a Poorer Agent
The agent's risk aversion introduces wealth e®ects absent in the standard screening
model with quasilinear utility: changing the wealth endowment changes the set of fea-
sible menus. An important question is how the agent's wealth endowment a®ects the
principal's pro¯t: Does the principal prefer a richer or poorer agent; one facing a larger
or smaller potential loss? In the ¯rst-best case (observable types), the answer is imme-
diate: the demand for insurance is higher if the loss amount is higher, or the agent is
poorer and risk aversion decreases with wealth (DARA); in either case pro¯t increases.
The ¯rst-best argument fails with adverse selection, since the incentive compatibility
and participation constraints change with wealth. And unfortunately the constraint
sets cannot be ordered by inclusion as wealth changes. Despite this complication, the
principal still prefers a poorer agent (under DARA) and a larger loss size.6
Theorem 2 (Wealth E®ects) The principal's maximum pro¯t is
(i) increasing in the loss size `;
(ii) increasing in the agent's risk aversion;
(iii) decreasing in wealth w if the agent's preferences satisfy DARA.
The proof of each part is similar. Fix an optimal menu. After each change{an increase
in `, risk aversion, or w (under DARA){the menu continues to satisfy the downward
incentive and participation constraints (though some upward incentive constraints may
6Part (iii) says that the principal prefers a poorer agent for a given loss amount. Clearly, the
principal might prefer a richer agent if the potential loss rises with wealth.
7fail). Now if we simply let each type choose its best contract from the original menu,
then the principal's pro¯t does not fall. Since the resulting menu satis¯es (IC) and (P),
the principal's maximum expected pro¯t cannot fall.
Proof : Since (iii) follows from (ii), we just prove (i) and (ii). Fix a menu (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£
satisfying (IC) and (P), with 0 · x(µ) · ` for all µ 2 £. (Any optimal menu satis¯es
these conditions almost everywhere.) Recall that by Lemma 1, t(µ) ¡ µ0x(µ) ¸ t(µ0) ¡
µ0x(µ0) if µ > µ0: i.e. pro¯t increases if a type takes the contract o®ered to a higher type.
(i) The Principal Prefers a Larger Loss Size. Let ` < ~ ` < w, let ~ U(x;t;µ) be
the expected utility of a type-µ agent for contract (x;t) when the loss is ~ ` (and U(x;t;µ)
the expected utility of a type-µ agent for (x;t) when the loss is `). Fix µ0 2 £ and let
(Â;¿) be any nonnegative contract bounded above by (x(µ0);t(µ0)) and no better than
(x(µ0);t(µ0)) for type µ0 when the loss is `:
(a) (0;0) · (Â;¿) · (x(µ0);t(µ0)); and
(b) U(Â;¿;µ0) · U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ0).
These inequalities of course hold if we set (Â;¿) equal to any lower type's contract in
the menu (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£, or to the null contract (0;0).
We now show that ~ U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ0) ¸ ~ U(Â;¿;µ0). If (Â;¿) = (x(µ0);t(µ0)), there is
nothing to prove, so suppose that (Â;¿) 6= (x(µ0);t(µ0)), which, by (a) and (b), implies
that Â ¡ ¿ < x(µ0) ¡ t(µ0). To simplify notation, set u`(µ0) = u(w ¡ ` + x(µ0) ¡ t(µ0)),
un(µ0) = u(w¡t(µ0)), un = u(w¡¿), u` = u(w¡`+Â¡¿), ~ u`(µ0) = u(w¡~ `+x(µ0)¡t(µ0)),
and ~ u` = (w ¡ ~ ` + Â ¡ ¿). Rewrite the inequality U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ0) ¸ U(Â;¿;µ0) as
u`(µ
0) ¡ u` ¸
1 ¡ µ0
µ0 (un ¡ un(µ
0)): (1)
The strict concavity of u(¢) and the inequality Â¡¿ < x(µ0)¡t(µ0) imply that ~ u`(µ0)¡~ u` >




0) > ~ U(Â;¿;µ
0): (2)
8Since, for each µ0 2 £, (2) holds for any (Â;¿) 6= (x(µ0);t(µ0)) satisfying (a) and (b), it
follows that (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ continues to satisfy all the downward incentive and partici-
pation constraints when the loss equals ~ `.7
Let C be the closure of the set f(x(µ);t(µ))jµ 2 £g[f(0;0)g. Consider the problem
of choosing a contract in C to maximize ~ U(¢;µ). (A solution exists since C is compact.)
Since (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ satis¯es (IC) when the loss is `, any maximizer (x;t) of ~ U(¢;¢;µ) on
C satis¯es U(x;t;µ) · U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) (the new choice cannot increase the pre-change
expected utility for µ). Moreover, C is ordered by the usual vector inequality ¸ on R2.
By (2), (x;t) ¸ (x(µ);t(µ)).8 Hence, by Lemma 1, pro¯t from the new contract does
not fall. (By Theorem 1 coverage levels in C are wlog bounded above by `.) Consider
a menu de¯ned by choosing for each µ 2 £ any maximizer of ~ U(¢;¢;µ). It satis¯es (IC)
and (P) when the loss is ~ ` and is at least as pro¯table as the original menu.
(ii) The Principal Prefers a More Risk Averse Agent. Let v(¢) be more risk
averse than u(¢): i.e., v(¢) = T(u(¢)), for some strictly increasing and strictly concave
function T(¢). Denote by V (x;t;µ) the expected utility of a type-µ agent with von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function v(¢).
As before, ¯x µ0 2 £ and let (Â;¿) be any point satisfying (a) and (b) from the proof
of (i). We will show that V (x(µ0);t(µ0);µ0) ¸ V (Â;¿;µ0).9 As in (i), we can suppose
that Â ¡ ¿ < x(µ0) ¡ t(µ0). Let u`(µ0), un(µ0), un and u` be de¯ned as before and set




0) ¡ V (Â;¿;µ











(µ¢u` + (1 ¡ µ)¢un)
¸ 0;
7If there were only a ¯nite number of types, the proof would be complete at this point, since we can
replace (IC) by the downward incentive compatibility constraints and monotonicity in that case.
8As the loss increases, the maximizers on C strongly increase in the sense of Shannon (1995), pp.
215-16. Equation (2) shows that U satis¯es the strict single crossing property in (x;t) and `, so the
conclusion in this sentence also follows from her Theorem 4.
9This inequality follows from Theorem 1 in Jewitt (1987). We nonetheless include its simple proof.
9where the ¯rst inequality follows from the strict concavity of T(¢), and the second from
the monotonicity of T(¢) and U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ) ¸ U(Â;¿;µ). Hence (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ satis¯es
the downward incentive compatibility and participation constraints after the increase in
risk aversion. As in the proof of (i), now let each type choose a best contract in C (the
closure of the original menu in R2 and (0;0)). Any such menu satis¯es (IC) and (P) after
the agent becomes more risk averse, and has at least as much pro¯t as (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£.
Hence, an increase in risk aversion cannot lower the principal's expected pro¯t. ¥
Contrast Theorem 2 with how the agent's wealth a®ects the principal under moral
hazard (Thiele and Wambach (1999)). Under moral hazard, a fall in agent's wealth
makes the agent less lazy (loosens the incentive constraints), but stronger conditions are
needed to conclude that the principal prefers a poorer agent. Under adverse selection,
a decrease in agent's wealth loosens both the downward incentive and the participation
constraints under just DARA, and we show that the potential tightening of the upward
incentive constraints does not lower expected pro¯t.
If pro¯t and wealth or loss size were observable, then Theorem 2 would be testable:
pro¯t is higher on menus o®ered to agents who are poorer or exposed to higher losses.
3.4 A Reformulation
We have restricted contracts to be deterministic: each type is o®ered a single premium-
indemnity pair. The simplest way to justify this restriction is to reformulate the problem
by a change of variables: instead of choosing a menu of contracts, the principal chooses
a menu of state-contingent utilities. We use this formulation for the rest of the paper.
Given a menu (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£, de¯ne, for each µ 2 £, u(µ) and ¢(µ) by
u(µ) = u(w ¡ t(µ)) (3)
¢(µ) = u(w ¡ t(µ)) ¡ u(w ¡ ` + x(µ) ¡ t(µ)): (4)
A menu (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ uniquely de¯nes a menu (u(µ);¢(µ))µ2£. Conversely, given
10(u(µ);¢(µ))µ2£, we can recover (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ by
t(µ) = w ¡ h(u(µ)) (5)
x(µ) = l ¡ (h(u(µ)) ¡ h(u(µ) ¡ ¢(µ))); (6)
where h = u¡1. Theorem 1 (i), (ii), and (iii) imply that, for any optimal menu, u(¢) and
¢(¢) are decreasing in µ, and that, for almost all µ 2 £, 0 · ¢(µ) · ¢0 = u(w)¡u(w¡`).





[w ¡ µ` ¡ (1 ¡ µ)h(u(µ)) ¡ µh(u(µ) ¡ ¢(µ))]dF(µ)
subject to




u(µ) ¡ µ¢(µ) ¸ U(0;0;µ) 8µ 2 £
¢(µ) · ¢0
¢(µ) ¸ 0 :
In other words, we can think of a menu of contracts as specifying, for each type µ, a
utility u(µ) in the no loss state, and a decrease in utility ¢(µ) in case of a loss. In
this formulation, the constraints are linear in the screening variables, and the objective
function is strictly concave in them. This formulation makes it clear that stochastic
menus cannot improve upon deterministic ones.10
Proposition 1 (Deterministic Menus) Any solution to the principal's problem in-
volves a deterministic contract for almost all types.
Proof. Suppose the principal o®ers each type µ in a set of positive probability a contract
consisting of random variables (~ x(µ);~ t(µ)). In the reformulated problem this implies
that the principal o®ers each type in that same set a contract consisting of random
variables (~ u(µ); ~ ¢(µ)). Since the constraints are linear in these variables, any type-µ
10Arnott and Stiglitz (1988), Proposition 10, proved a similar result for the two-type case. Our
reformulation allows us to extend this result to any number of types arbitrarily distributed.
11agent's constraints are satis¯ed if ~ u(µ) and ~ ¢(µ) are replaced by their expected values.
But pro¯t increases from this change since the objective function is strictly concave. ¥
4 Continuum of Types: The Density Case
To obtain further properties, from now on we specialize to the case in which u(¢) is
C2, with positive ¯rst and negative second derivatives, £ = [µ;µ], and F(¢) is C2 on £
with density F 0(¢) = f(¢) that is positive on (µ;µ). Except for the possibility of a zero
density at the endpoints, this distribution assumption is the most common one used in
contracting problems with adverse selection. Yet, except for Stiglitz (1977), this case
has been neglected by the literature on insurance with adverse selection. Under this
assumption we can provide strong results for complete sorting of types, exclusion, and
for the existence of `quantity discounts.'
Abusing notation, now let U(µ) be the expected utility of type µ 2 £ for a menu
satisfying (IC) and (P). We prove in the Appendix that if f(¢) is continuous and positive
in the interior of £, then U(¢) is continuously di®erentiable. (This fact follows from
showing that any type's best choice from an optimal menu is unique.) By the Envelope
Theorem (Milgrom and Segal (2002), Theorem 3), we have U0(µ) = ¡¢(µ). We can use
these facts to formulate the principal's problem as an optimal control problem.
4.1 The Optimal Control Problem
Let _ U(µ) denote the derivative of U. By standard arguments, U(¢) is convex, and (IC)
holds if and only if _ U(µ) = ¡¢(µ) almost everywhere and ¢(¢) is nonincreasing, so there
is no loss of generality in replacing (IC) by these two conditions. Moreover, by Theorem
1 (iv), U(µ) = U(0;0;µ). Since U(¢) is C1, we can write the principal's problem as an
optimal control problem with a continuous control variable ¢(¢), a C1 state variable





[w ¡ µ` ¡ (1 ¡ µ)h(U(µ) + µ¢(µ)) ¡ µh(U(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¢(µ))]f(µ)dµ
12subject to
¢(¢) nonincreasing (7)
¢(µ) ¸ 0 8µ (8)
¢(µ) · ¢0 8µ (9)
_ U(µ) = ¡¢(µ) 8µ (10)
U(µ) = U(0;0;µ) (11)
U(µ) free. (12)
In the standard model with quasilinear preferences, the objective function is linear in
the indirect utility. The usual next step in that case is to use Fubini's Theorem to
eliminate the transfer and optimize pointwise with respect to the remaining variable, a
great simpli¯cation. Since our objective is not linear in the indirect utility U, we are
forced to proceed with optimal control arguments.
Consider the `relaxed problem' that ignores (7)-(9), and let ¸(¢) be the costate vari-
able of the problem.If a solution to the relaxed problem satis¯es the omitted constraints,
then of course it solves the original problem.
The Hamiltonian is
H(U;¢;¸;µ) = [w¡µ`¡(1¡µ)h(U(µ)+µ¢(µ))¡µh(U(µ)¡(1¡µ)¢(µ))]f(µ)¡¸(µ)¢(µ);
and any solution to the relaxed problem satis¯es
¡¸(µ) = f(µ)µ(1 ¡ µ)[h
0(U(µ) + µ¢(µ)) ¡ h
0(U(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¢(µ))] (13)
_ ¸(µ) = f(µ)[(1 ¡ µ)h
0(U(µ) + µ¢(µ)) + µh
0(U(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¢(µ))] (14)
¸(µ) = 0; (15)
as well as (10) and (11).11
Note that ¸(µ) · 0, and ¸(µ) < 0 if ¢(µ) > 0; also _ ¸(µ) > 0 for all µ. Integrate (14)
11The Hamiltonian is strictly concave in (U;¢), so these conditions are also su±cient for optimality.
13with respect to µ, use (15), and replace the resulting expression in (13) to ¯nd
f(µ)µ(1 ¡ µ)[h
0(U(µ) + µ¢(µ)) ¡ h




where a(s) = (1 ¡ s)h0(U(s) + s¢(s)) + sh0(U(s) ¡ (1 ¡ s)¢(s)) > 0. It follows from
(16) that the omitted constraint (8) is satis¯ed for all types. Note that, in line with
Theorem 1 (ii) and (iv), we have ¢(µ) = 0 and ¢(µ) > 0 for all µ < µ: type µ gets full
coverage and, to ensure incentive compatibility, all other types get partial coverage.12
Equation (16) illustrates the standard e±ciency vs. information rent trade-o® of
screening problems: the left side is the marginal bene¯t (increase in pro¯t) of providing
type µ with additional insurance (lower ¢(µ)), i.e., more e±ciency, while the right side
is the marginal cost (decrease in pro¯t) of doing so, as it leads to an increase in the
information rent left to all higher types to ensure that incentive compatibility is satis¯ed.
To see this last point, note that the cost of giving type µ one more unit of utility is
a(µ)f(µ); but giving µ an additional unit of utility increases also the utility of all higher




By the Implicit Function Theorem and (16), ¢(¢) is C1 on £ (except possibly at the
endpoints when f is zero there). Hence we can replace (7) with _ ¢(µ) · 0 for all µ 2 £.
We next determine when the solution to the relaxed problem satis¯es this constraint.
Di®erentiate (13) with respect to µ and use (10) to obtain, after some algebra,
_ ¢(µ) =
¸(µ)[f0(µ)µ(1 ¡ µ) + f(µ)(1 ¡ 2µ)] ¡ f(µ)µ(1 ¡ µ)_ ¸(µ)
f(µ)2µ2(1 ¡ µ)2[µh00(U(µ) + µ¢(µ)) + (1 ¡ µ)h00(U(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¢(µ))]
: (17)
Since h00(¢) > 0, the denominator of (17) is positive, and the sign of _ ¢(µ) depends on
the sign of the numerator. We now derive conditions for complete sorting of types at
12This result is clear if f(µ) > 0. And if f(µ) = 0, then ¢(µn) tends to zero for any sequence µn
in £ tending to µ. To see this second point, divide both sides of (13) by f(µn) and use the Mean
Value Theorem to write the right side as Ã(µ)(1 ¡ F(µn))=f(µn). The conclusion now follows since
limµ!µ f(µ)=(1 ¡ F(µ)) = 1 (Barlow, Marshall, and Proschan (1963), pp. 377-378). In Section 6 we
show by example that this conclusion fails if µ = 1.
14the optimal contract; i.e., for _ ¢(¢) < 0 everywhere. As already proved in Theorem 1,
equation (17) implies that there is no pooling of types at the top; i.e., _ ¢(µ) < 0.13
Lemma 2 (Complete Sorting) The optimal menu sorts all types who obtain some




3µ ¡ 2 ¡ b(µ)
µ(1 ¡ µ)
; (18)
where b(µ) = h0(U(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¢(µ))=[h0(U(µ) + µ¢(µ)) ¡ h0(U(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¢(µ))].
Proof. Appendix. ¥
An obvious problem with condition (18) is that b(¢) is endogenous. But it immediately
gives f0(µ)=f(µ) > (3µ¡2)=µ(1¡µ) as a su±cient condition for complete sorting, a fact
pointed out by Stiglitz (1977). To improve upon this condition, note that b(µ) ¸ bl for
every µ, where bl = h0(u(w ¡`)¡(µ ¡µ)¢0)=[h0(u(w)+(µ ¡µ)¢0)¡h0(u(w ¡`)¡(µ ¡
µ)¢0)] > 0. By Lemma 2, complete sorting follows if f0(µ)=f(µ) > (3µ¡2¡b`)=µ(1¡µ).
Although it depends only on primitives, this condition is hard to verify and does not
even imply what we know from Theorem 1, that there is no pooling at the top.
The next result addresses these problems. Let ½(µ) =
f(µ)
1¡F(µ) denote the hazard rate of
the distribution. We say that f(¢) satis¯es the monotone hazard rate condition (MHRC)
if ½(¢) is increasing in µ; it satis¯es the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) if
f0(¢)=f(¢) is decreasing in µ. As is well-known and easy to check, MLRP implies MHRC.
Theorem 3 (Complete Sorting: Su±cient Conditions) The optimal menu com-




µ(1¡µ) for all µ 2 [µ;µ]; or
(ii) f(¢) satis¯es MLRP and either µ · 1=2 or f0(¢) ¸ 0; or
(iii) f(¢) is C1, f0(¢)=f(¢) is bounded on £, and ` is su±ciently small (how small
depends on the primitives).
Proof. The proofs of parts (i) and (ii) are in the Appendix. To prove part (iii), note
that lim`!0 u(w ¡ `) = u(w) and thus lim`!0 ¢0 = 0. Consequently, lim`!0 bl = 1.
13If f(µ) > 0, then (14) and (15) imply that _ ¢(µ) < 0. If f(µ) = 0, then f0(µ)=f(µ) ! ¡1 as µ ! µ,
so in either case limsupµ!µ _ ¢(µ) < 0, implying _ ¢(µ) < 0 for types near µ.
15Since the ratio f0(¢)=f(¢) is bounded, there exists a threshold for the loss, ^ ` > 0, such
that (18) is satis¯ed for all types if ` 2 (0; ^ `). ¥
In the standard contracting model with quasilinear utility and private values, the
MHRC implies complete sorting. Part (i) modi¯es that familiar condition: it is weaker
than the MHRC for µ < 1=3, stronger otherwise. In particular, if ¹ µ · 1=3, then the
MHRC also implies complete sorting in our model. Common values and wealth e®ects
make it hard to con¯rm whether the MHRC implies complete sorting when ¹ µ > 1=3.14
In Section 6 we show that it does not: we calculate a closed-form solution for the CARA
case, and ¯nd densities satisfying the MHRC for which some bunching is optimal.
Part (ii) shows that sorting is complete if the MLRP holds and either the highest
type below 1=2 or the density is nondecreasing. It is easy to check that (ii) is satis¯ed
for the class of densities on [µ;µ] given by f(µ) = (1+®)µ®=(µ
®+1
¡µ
®+1), ® ¸ 0, which
includes the uniform distribution. Part (iii) shows that if f(¢) is C1 and the likelihood
ratio is bounded, then there is a region of losses for which sorting is complete.
In short, if either (i), (ii), or (iii) hold, then the omitted constraint (7) is satis¯ed.
4.3 Exclusion
It follows from (7) and (9) that the set of types that receive some insurance at the
optimum is [µ0;µ], with µ0 ¸ µ. We now prove two results on the value of µ0, one for no
type to be excluded (µ0 = µ), and one for a subset of low types to be excluded (µ0 > µ).
Proposition 2 (No Exclusion) Suppose that either Theorem 3 (i) or (ii) holds. If
f(µ) is su±ciently large, then no type is excluded in an optimal menu.
Proof. Appendix. ¥
Intuitively, Proposition 2 shows that no type is excluded (and thus constraint (9)
does not bind) if the presence of low types in the population is signi¯cant enough.
Proposition 3 (Exclusion) Suppose that either Theorem 3 (i) or (ii) holds. There
exists a k > 0 (depending on primitives) such that, if f(~ µ)=(1¡F(~ µ)) < k=~ µ(1¡ ~ µ), then
all types µ · µ · ~ µ are excluded in an optimal menu.
14One can show that if ¡u000(¢)=u00(¢) · ¡3u00(¢)=u0(¢) (a class which includes several commonly used
functional forms), then we can replace 1/3 by 1/2.
16Proof. Appendix. ¥
The su±cient condition for exclusion in Proposition 3 depends only on the primitives
of the problem, i.e., u(¢), w, `, and f(¢). In particular, it suggests that a type is excluded
if it is close to zero and if its presence in the population (density) is insigni¯cant.
4.4 Curvature
We now turn to curvature of the premium as a function of coverage, including quantity
discounts. The question is important for several reasons. First, ¯rms commonly o®er
quantity discounts in practice, so it is natural to ask whether a monopolist insurer would
use them. Second, in competitive insurance models, quantity premia rather of discounts
are the rule since equilibrium prices equal marginal cost (in many competitive models);
we would like to know if this implication holds for a monopolist.
Let (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ be an optimal menu. Since the coverage x(¢) cannot increase
unless the premium t(¢) increases, there is an increasing function T(¢) on [x(µ);`] such
that t(µ) = T(x(µ)) for all µ 2 [µ;µ].15 We want to know when T(x)=x is nonincreasing.
A simpler question is to determine when T(¢) is concave and we focus on this property.
To begin, it is easy to show that T(¢) cannot be concave if a positive measure of
agents pool at any (x;t) with x > 0.16 So we assume for the rest of this section that the
optimal menu sorts types completely.
Since sorting is complete, x(¢) is strictly increasing, so it has an inverse, call it z(¢)
(i.e., µ = z(x)). We can now describe an optimal menu as a nonlinear premium schedule
T(x) = t(z(x)). By the ¯rst-order condition, the slope of T(¢) at x(µ) equals type-µ's
marginal rate of substitution of x for t (see equation (42) in Section A.7):
_ T(x(µ)) = ¡Ux(x(µ);t(µ);µ)=Ut(x(µ);t(µ);µ): (19)
We now determine the sign of the second derivative of T(¢), which we denote by Ä T(¢).
15If x(µ) > 0, we can extend T(¢) to all of [0;`] by setting T(x) = ¿(x), where ¿(x) is de¯ned by
U(x;¿(x);µ) = U(0;0;µ). Note that if x(µ) > 0, then T(¢) is concave on [0;x(µ)] and di®erentiable at
x(µ).
16Suppose that x(µ0) = x(µ1) = ~ x > 0 with µ1 > µ0. Setting u` = u(w ¡ ` + x(µ) ¡ t(µ)) and
un = u(w ¡ t(µ)), we have _ T(~ x¡) · µ0u0
`=(µ0u0
` + (1 ¡ µ0)u0
n) < µ1u0
`=(µ1u0
` + (1 ¡ µ1)u0
n) · _ T(~ x+), so
T(¢) cannot be concave.
17Lemma 3 (Curvature) Let T(¢) be an optimal nonlinear premium schedule that com-




3µ ¡ 2 + c(µ)
µ(1 ¡ µ)
; (20)








Note that c(µ) < 1 for all µ. Thus, (20) implies that the premium schedule is concave
if f0(µ)=f(µ) > (3µ¡1)=µ(1¡µ), which holds for example if f(¢) is uniform with µ < 1=3.
As with our sorting lemma, an objection to (20) is that c(¢) is endogenous; but in
some cases, it gives us a complete description of the curvature of T(¢).
Example 1 (Uniform distribution, log utility) Let f(¢) be uniform on [0;µ] with
µ > 1
2 and u(¢) = log(¢). By Theorem 3, sorting is complete. Moreover c(µ) = µ in
this case. Since f0(µ) = 0 for all µ, we have by (20) that T(¢) is `backwards-S shaped,'
concave on [0;x(1
2)] and convex on [x(1
2);`]. Thus it exhibits quantity discounts, at least
for small coverage levels. If f(¢) is uniform on just [0; 1
2], then T(¢) is globally concave,
and exhibits quantity discounts globally.
The curvature property in this example holds far more generally. Under the MLRP, the
left side is decreasing. If the right side were increasing, then the backwards-S shaped
property would hold. The endogenous c(µ) makes monotonicity of the right side hard
to check, but if preferences satisfy DARA, then we can show that the right side of (20)
crosses the left side at most once and from below.
Theorem 4 (Backwards S-shaped Premium) Let T(¢) be an optimal schedule that
completely sorts types, and suppose that both the MLRP and DARA hold. Then
(i) there is an ^ x 2 [x(µ);`] such that T(¢) is concave below and convex above ^ x;
(ii) if f0(¢) takes positive and negative values, T(¢) is strictly concave on an interval of
positive length if µ < 1=3 and strictly convex on an interval of positive length if µ > 2=3.
Proof. (i) Denote the right side of (20) by g(µ). We ¯rst show that c0(µ) ¸ 0 implies






3µ2 ¡ 4µ + 2 ¡ c(µ)(1 ¡ 2µ)
µ2(1 ¡ µ)2 :
Since c(µ) 2 (0;1), it follows that 3µ2 ¡ 4µ + 2 ¡ c(µ)(1 ¡ 2µ) > 2=3 > 0. Therefore,
c0(µ) ¸ 0 implies that g0(µ) > 0.
We have _ T(x) = µu0
`=[(1 ¡ µ)u0
n + µu0
`] (equation (19)); rearrange to ¯nd (1 ¡
µ)u0
n=µu0






_ T ¡ 1)
; (21)




















where ­ = (1 +
r`
rn( 1
_ T ¡ 1))¡2. Since the menu is increasing in µ, DARA implies that
@
r`
rn=@µ · 0. By (22), if Ä T(x(µ0)) ¸ 0 , then c0(µ0) ¸ 0 and so g0(µ0) > 0. Thus, g(¢)
crosses the decreasing function f0(¢)=f(¢) at most once from below, so there is an interval
(^ µ;µ] with T(¢) convex on the interval fx(µ)jµ 2 (^ µ;µ]g and concave otherwise. Setting
^ x = x(^ µ) completes the proof that T(¢) is backwards-S shaped.
(ii) This result follows from (20) and c(µ) 2 (0;1). ¥
Theorem 4 is the most surprising result of the paper: despite the complications
of common values and wealth e®ects, it holds under the weak and commonly-imposed
assumptions of the MLRP on the density and DARA on preferences. We are not aware
of such a curvature result in other monopoly pricing models.17
For some intuition consider Figure 1, which shows a contract for an interior type
µ. By (IC), optimal menus are monotone, so contracts given to lower types must lie
17Spence (1977) considers a nonlinear pricing problem of allocating a good in ¯xed supply, and ¯nds
that the a tari® chosen to maximize a weighted sum of utilities can be backwards S-shaped. But his
curvature result is an artifact of the weights used: with equal weights on types, the tari® is a±ne. He
also examines the tari® chosen by a monopolist when U = µu(x) ¡ t with u(¢) strictly increasing and
concave; the tari® is globally concave under the MHRC.
19Premium





Figure 1: If an interior type gets `close enough' to its ¯rst-best contract, then the
premium cannot be convex below, or concave above that type's coverage
in the shaded region. If the contract given to type µ is `close enough' to its ¯rst best
(the zero-surplus full-insurance contract for that type) then T(¢) cannot be convex on
[0;x(µ)].18 By equation (19), _ T(x(µ)) equals the slope of the indi®erence curve of µ at
(x(µ);t(µ)). If T(¢) were concave on [x(µ);`], then _ T(x) · _ T(x(µ)) for all x 2 [x(µ);`].
But if x(µ) is `close' to `, then (see equation (19)) _ T(x(µ)) ¼ µ < µ = _ T(x(µ)), which is
inconsistent with pro¯t maximization. In short, if some interior type's contract is close
enough to its ¯rst-best contract, then T(¢) at least cannot be S-shaped (¯rst convex, then
concave). Why should an interior type have a contract `close' to its ¯rst best? First,
interior types are relatively more likely under the MLRP (with f0(¢) changing signs);
second, if the the support is wide enough, ¯rst-best pro¯t is maximized at some interior
type. Since some interior types are both more likely and more pro¯table than extreme
types, optimal menus push contracts for some interior types `close' to their ¯rst-best.
Quantity discounts over some range distinguishes the monopoly case from the com-
petitive model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In that model, the equilibrium premium
for a type µ is t(µ) = µx(µ), where x(¢) is the (increasing) equilibrium indemnity func-
tion. Hence, t(µ)=x(µ) = µ and there are always quantity premia.19 Theorem 4 implies
that this is not an implication of adverse selection as such, but from the joint imposition
of adverse selection and (some form of) perfect competition.
18Graphically, the indi®erence curve of this type passes `close' to the origin, since this type gets little
surplus. Strict concavity of indi®erence curves then rules out convexity of T(¢) on [0;x(µ)].
19See Wilson (1993), pp. 382-84, for another insurance example with quantity premia.
20Theorem 4 also has implications for empirical work on insurance. For instance,
Cawley and Philipson (1999) use the quantity premium implication from Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976) to test for the presence of adverse selection in (term) life insurance.
They regress the premium on a quadratic function of the coverage amount and ¯nd
that the coe±cient on the squared term is zero, and that the intercept is positive. They
conclude that the estimated a±ne function{which implies quantity discounts{is evidence
against adverse selection in life insurance. But by Theorem 4, their empirical ¯nding
could be consistent with a monopolist facing adverse selection.
5 Comparison with the Standard Monopoly Model
In their seminal monopoly pricing paper, Maskin and Riley (1984) assume that type-
µ buyer's preferences over quantity-payment pairs (x;t) are of the form U(x;t;µ) =
v(x;µ) ¡ t, where v(x;µ) =
R x
0 p(q;µ)dq, and p(¢;µ) is decreasing in q and p(q;¢) is
increasing in µ (p. 172). The cost of selling x units to any type is cx, where c is
a positive constant. Thus theirs is a private-values model with no wealth e®ects on
demand, in contrast to our insurance model.
Maskin and Riley (1984) restrict attention either to a ¯nite number of types or a
continuum of types distributed according to an atomless density. A careful inspection
of the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, however, reveals that they can be adapted to
their model. That is, each property has an analogue in the standard monopoly model,
and can be derived for a general type distribution. For example, in that setting Lemma 1
says that a change in the quantity in the direction of a type's ¯rst-best quantity increases
the monopolist's pro¯t if the payment rises enough to make the type worse o®. (One can
even introduce common values in the monopoly pricing model and adapt these results,
so long as the ¯rst best quantity is increasing in types.)
Arguably, the most important di®erence between the two models is curvature. For
example, in Maskin and Riley (1984) there are always quantity discounts for the highest



























n) ¸ µ, with equality if and only if µ = µ (see equation (42) in Section A.7).
If _ x(µ)¼(µ) < 0, then revenue per unit, t(¢)=x(¢), must be rising at µ. And in a small
enough neighborhood including the highest type, t(¢)=x(¢) is decreasing if and only if
pro¯t is positive for the highest type. In Maskin and Riley (1984), pro¯t from every type
is nonnegative, and is always positive for the highest type. But even in the two-type
case, pro¯t from the highest type can be negative in an optimal insurance menu.
Remark 1 (Pro¯t monotonicity) Chiappori, Jullien, Salani¶ e, and Salani¶ e (2006)
also use a `pro¯t monotonicity' condition{pro¯t does not increase from contracts with
higher coverage{to test for adverse selection and competition. They point out that this
assumption need not hold in Stiglitz (1977). To understand the issue more clearly, note
that _ ¼(µ) = _ t(µ)¡µ_ x(µ)¡x(µ). Since x(¹ µ) = ` and _ t(¹ µ)¡ ¹ µ_ x(¹ µ) = 0 (by (40)-(41) in the
Appendix), we have _ ¼(¹ µ) = ¡` < 0: pro¯t monotonicity holds near the highest type. But
if a type gets small enough coverage, then pro¯t monotonicity fails, since _ t(µ)¡µ_ x(µ) > 0
for µ < ¹ µ (again by (40)-(41)). In particular, it fails if any type is excluded. But if the
lowest type is o®ered high enough coverage, pro¯t monotonicity could hold for a monopoly
as well. We leave as an open question the conditions under which it fails or holds.
6 The CARA Case
Wealth e®ects make it hard to ¯nd closed-form solutions. Under CARA, however, we
can calculate the optimal menu, and we use it to illustrate properties of the insurance
problem absent in the standard monopoly pricing problem.
Set u(z) = ¡e¡rz. Letting v(x;µ) = log[(1¡µ)+µer(`¡x)]=r, the certainty equivalent of
(x;t) is w¡t¡v(x;µ), which represents the same preferences over contracts as U(x;t;µ).
Since the certainty equivalent is linear in t, it is simplest to proceed is as in the standard
monopoly model, solving directly for x(¢) without transforming the variables.20
Solution to the Relaxed Problem. The optimal indemnity in the relaxed
problem satis¯es the ¯rst order condition vx(x;µ) ¡ µ ¡ (vxµ(x;µ)=½(µ)) = 0 for each µ,
20More precisely, replace t(¢) from the objective function, integrate by parts, and maximize pointwise
with respect to x(¢) ignoring the monotonicity condition.
22which simpli¯es to (setting » = er(`¡x) and recalling that ½ is the hazard rate)




This equation is quadratic in »; since » ¸ 0, we take the positive solution
»(µ) =
1
½(µ) ¡ µ(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ 2µ) +
r³
µ(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ 2µ) ¡ 1
½(µ)
´2
+ 4µ3(1 ¡ µ)3
2µ2(1 ¡ µ)
: (24)
Since »(µ) = er(`¡x(µ)), we have x(µ) = ` ¡ (log»(µ)=r), and t(µ) = v(x(µ);µ) ¡ v(0;µ) ¡
R µ
µ vµ(x(s);s)ds, which completes the solution to the (relaxed) problem.
Losses with Certainty and Partial Insurance at the Top. The proof
in Theorem 1 that, wlog, the highest type gets full coverage uses the assumption that
µ < 1. The highest type need not get full coverage when µ = 1, i.e., when the highest
type su®ers a loss with certainty. To illustrate, let the density be uniform on [µ;1], so
that ½(µ) = 1=(1 ¡ µ). Simplify (24) to ¯nd
»(µ) =
1 ¡ µ + 2µ2 +
p
1 ¡ 2µ + 5µ2
2µ2 ;
and evaluate at µ = 1 to ¯nd »(1) = 2 and so x(1) = ` ¡ (log2=r) < `. In this case, the
optimal menu is uniformly bounded away from full insurance.
MHRC Does Not Imply Complete Sorting. As noted, the MHRC implies
complete sorting in many screening models. Since none of the conditions in Theorem 3
follow from the MHRC, it leaves open whether the MHRC implies complete sorting in
our insurance model. Equation (24) suggests that it does not. Let µ > 2=3 and let f(¢)
be any density such that ½(¢) is globally increasing in µ but constant at a type ^ µ > 2=3
(i.e., ½0(^ µ) = 0). Then the left side of (23) is decreasing in µ at ^ µ, and »(¢) fails to be
decreasing at that point.21
For an numerical example, let f(¢) be the truncated exponential at µ < 1 with
parameter ´. Then ½(µ) = (´e¡´µ)=(e¡´µ ¡ e¡´µ) and ½0(µ) > 0 for all µ. Insert this
21Consider the density f(µ) = ke¡kµ if µ 2 [µ; ~ µ] and f(µ) = ke¡k^ µ otherwise, where k = 1=(µ ¡ ~ µ).
Then x(¢) is not increasing in a neighborhood of ^ µ.
23expression into (24) and set ´ = 30 and µ = 0:9 to ¯nd that »(0:5) = 1:14 < 1:2 = »(0:8),
so that x(¢) is not increasing everywhere: Complete sorting fails even under the MHRC.
The example provides a clear intuition for why the MHRC does not imply complete
sorting. Suppressing for a moment the common values feature of the model, suppose
that the insurer's unit cost of coverage is constant and equal to µ. Then the ¯rst order
condition for the relaxed problem is vx(x;µ)¡µ = vxµ(x;µ)=½(µ) for each µ. The marginal
gain from an increase in coverage (the left side) is increasing in µ, while the marginal
cost per unit of type µ of the additional information rent to all higher types (right side)
is decreasing in µ if the MHRC holds. So without common values or wealth e®ects, the
MHRC implies that the solution to the relaxed problem is increasing. With common
values, the left side is no longer increasing in µ (i.e., vxµ(x;µ) is not always greater than
1), and a strengthening of the MHRC is needed.22 With wealth e®ects this problem is
compounded, since the MHRC does not even imply that
R µ
µ a(s)f(s)ds=f(µ) is decreasing
in µ (see (16)), explaining why we impose the stronger conditions of Theorem 3.
Common Values and Curvature. From Theorem 4, if f(¢) satis¯es the MLRP
and µ > 2=3, the premium is convex in coverage for µ 2 (2=3;µ]. The CARA case
illustrates the role of common values in curvature of the premium. Suppress once again
common values, so we are back in a standard monopoly pricing model with quasilinear
utility and no common values. Following Maskin and Riley (1984), the necessary and












After tedious algebra, (25) becomes ½0(µ)=½(µ) > (2µ¡1)=(µ(1¡µ)) for all µ: any density
satisfying the MLRP and this inequality implies a concave premium globally (and so also
quantity discounts) in the CARA case. For a simple example, consider the uniform on
[0; ¹ µ]. Then ½0(µ)=½(µ) = 1=(µ ¡ µ) > (2µ ¡ 1)=(µ(1 ¡ µ)) for all µ.
22Indeed, that the left side is not increasing is why there can be pooling even in the ¯rst-best case
(observable types): all types get full coverage, and two distinct types can pay the same premium. In
Maskin and Riley, the ¯rst-best menu completely sorts types.
247 Conclusion
Stiglitz (1977) introduced the insurance model that we examine, and solved the two-
type case with an illuminating graphical analysis that is now a textbook standard. But
despite the importance of adverse selection in insurance and well-known problems with
its competitive provision, the monopoly case has received surprisingly little attention.
Insurance markets surely lie somewhere in between competition and monopoly. Ar-
guably, monopoly is the right place to start thinking about noncompetitive insurance
markets: for insurance with adverse selection, there is no agreement on what a good
model even of competition is, let alone oligopoly. Indeed, Cohen and Einav (2007) argue
that a monopoly model describes their data for an entrant into the Israeli auto insurance
market better than a competitive one.
We have stressed the di®erences between monopoly and competitive insurance with
adverse selection. One similarity is monotonicity: riskier types buy more coverage;
equivalently, those who buy more coverage experience higher losses on average. Many
tests of adverse selection focus on this prediction. Monotonicity follows from incentive
compatibility and the single crossing property, which in turn follows from the de¯nition
of a type (the loss chance) and the expected utility hypothesis. Relaxing either one can
overturn this property{and likely monotonicity as well. For example, single crossing can
fail if the type includes the agent's risk attitudes as well as riskiness; and it can fail if
the agent's preferences violate expected utility.23 Both extensions are worth pursuing.
Two other extensions are worth mentioning: allowing more than one loss amount;
and more than one period. If the loss takes on more than one value, but the private
information is still purely about likelihood of a loss, not its magnitude, then the principal
will o®er a menu of deductible insurance contracts. Since a deductible contract is still
two-dimensional, many of our proofs can be adapted to this case. The multi-period case
raises several interesting issues such as renegotiation and experience rating, and should
reveal further implications of adverse selection for insurance.
23Ormiston and Schlee (2001) show it fails for mean-variance preferences. Since some nonexpected
utility representations satisfy the single crossing property, we conjecture that adding that assumption
will preserve the conclusion of Theorem 1, but not that of Theorems 2-4.
25A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 (Properties of an Optimal Menu)
In the proof of Theorem 1 we use the following result:
Lemma 4 (Indirect Utility Function) Let (x(¢);t(¢)) be bounded and satisfy (IC),
with x(µ) · ` for all µ 2 £. Then U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) is decreasing and continuous in µ.
Proof. Let µ0 > µ. We have U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) ¸ U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ) ¸ U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ0),
where the ¯rst inequality follows from (IC) and the second from x(µ0) · `. Hence
U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) is decreasing in µ.
Monotonicity implies that the left and right limits exist at any µ 2 £. Let µ0 2 £. We
will show that the left and right limits of U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) are equal at µ = µ0. Consider




0) ¡ U(xn;tn;µn) ¸ U(xn;tn;µ
0) ¡ U(xn;tn;µn); (26)
where the ¯rst inequality follows from monotonicity of U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) in µ, and the
second from (IC). But U(xn;tn;µ0)¡U(xn;tn;µn) = (µ0¡µn)(u(w¡`¡tn+xn)¡u(w¡tn)).
Since (x(¢);t(¢)) is bounded and u(¢) continuous, U(xn;tn;µ0) ¡ U(xn;tn;µn) tends to 0
as µn tends to µ0, so by (26), U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) is left-continuous at µ = µ0.
Now consider any sequence µn approaching µ0 from above. For every n,









where the ¯rst inequality follows from monotonicity in µ and the second from (IC). But
again U(x0;t0;µn) ¡ U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ0) tends to zero as µn tends to µ0, so U(xn;tn;µn)
converges to U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ0), proving that U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) is right-continuous at µ = µ0.
Since µ0 was arbitrary, it follows that U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) is continuous in µ. ¥
We now prove Theorem 1 in several steps, illustrating the formal arguments with
pictures. Most of the proofs are by contraposition: we show that if the property fails for
a menu, then there is another feasible menu with higher pro¯t (relying on Lemma 1).
26(i) Premium, Indemnity, and Net Indemnity are Co-Monotone. Wlog, let µ0 >
µ. From (IC), U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) ¸ U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ) and U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ0) ¸ U(x(µ);t(µ);µ0),
so that either (a) x(µ0) ¡ t(µ0) ¸ x(µ) ¡ t(µ) and t(µ0) ¸ t(µ), or (b) x(µ0) ¡ t(µ0) ·
x(µ)¡t(µ) and t(µ0) · t(µ) (the other remaining cases are easily dismissed by (IC)). Un-
less the contracts are the same, case (b) is ruled out by the single crossing property (if the
low type prefers a higher contract, so does the high type). Thus, x(µ0)¡t(µ0) ¸ x(µ)¡t(µ)
and t(µ0) ¸ t(µ), which together imply that x(µ0) ¸ x(µ).
(ii) No Overinsurance. Let (x(¢);t(¢)) be a feasible menu with x(µ) > ` on a positive
measure set of types. Let ^ µ be the in¯mum of types with coverage greater than the loss
`. By monotonicity, every type µ > ^ µ must have x(µ) > `. There are two cases.
(a) ^ µ 2 fµ 2 £jx(µ) > `g. In this case x(^ µ) > ` and x(µ) · ` for every type µ < ^ µ
in £. For each µ 2 [µ; ^ µ] \ £, let (`;~ t(µ)) be the contract that leaves type µ indi®erent
between his contract in the menu and this one; formally, ~ t(µ)) solves
U(`;~ t(µ);µ) = U(x(µ);t(µ);µ):
De¯ne ^ t = sup~ t(µ), where the supremum is taken over fµ 2 £jµ · ^ µg. Pool all types
µ ¸ ^ µ at (`;^ t), and leave the contract for every other type unchanged (see Figure 2(a)).
The new menu satis¯es (IC) and (P) and increases pro¯t by Lemma 1.
(b) ^ µ = 2 fµ 2 £jx(µ) > `g. Then x(^ µ) · `. For each type µ ¸ ^ µ, let ¿(µ) solve
U(`;¿(µ);µ) = U(x(µ);t(µ);µ):
De¯ne ¿¤ = sup¿(µ), where the supremum is taken over fµ 2 £jµ ¸ ^ µg. Pool all types
µ > ^ µ at (`;¿¤), and leave the contract for every other type the same (see Figure 2(b)).
The new menu satis¯es (IC) and (P) and pro¯t increases by Lemma 1.
(iii) Premium, Indemnity, and Net Indemnity are Nonnegative. It is enough
to show that t(µ) ¸ 0 for almost all types: if that condition holds, then (P) implies that
x(µ) ¸ 0 and x(µ)¡t(µ) ¸ 0 for almost all types. Let (x(¢);t(¢)) be a feasible menu with
t(µ) < 0 on a positive measure set of types. By monotonicity, that set contains all types
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Figure 2: (ii) No overinsurance
(a) µs 2 fµ 2 £jt(µ) < 0g. In this case t(µs) < 0. For each type µ ¸ µs, ¯nd the
contract (^ x(µ);0) that leaves type µ indi®erent between his contract in the menu and
this one; formally, ^ x(µ) solves
U(^ x(µ);0;µ) = U(x(µ);t(µ);µ):
Since the menu satis¯es (P), ^ x(µ) ¸ 0 for every µ. Let xm = inf x(µ), where the in¯mum
is taken over all types µ ¸ µs. (Note that xm ¸ x(µ) for all types µ · µs.) Pool all types
µ · µs at (xm;0), and leave the contract the same for all other types (see Figure 3(a)).
The new menu satis¯es (IC) and (P) and pro¯t increases by Lemma 1.
(b) µs = 2 fµ 2 £jt(µ) < 0g. In this case t(µs) ¸ 0. For each type µ · µs, let ^ x(µ) solve
U(^ x(µ);0;µ) = U(x(µ);t(µ);µ);
and let xs = inf ^ x(µ), where the in¯mum is taken over fµ 2 £jµ · µsg. Note that
xs ¸ x(µ) for all types µ · µs. Pool all types with t(µ) < 0 at (xs;0), and leave the
















Figure 3: (iii) Nonnegativity
and (P) and pro¯t increases by Lemma 1 and (ii).
(iv) Participation Binds at the Bottom. Let (x(¢);t(¢)) be a feasible menu with
U(x(µ);t(µ);µ)¡U(0;0;µ) = K > 0. Since expected utility is continuous in µ, there is a
nonnegative number " such that [µ;µ+"] has positive measure and, for all µ 2 [µ;µ+"]\£,
U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) ¡ U(0;0;µ) > 0:
(If µ itself has positive measure, then " can be zero.) By (IC),
U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) ¡ U(0;0;µ) ¸ U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) ¡ U(0;0;µ)
for all µ 2 [µ;µ +"]\£. But since the di®erence on the right side of this last inequality
tends to K as µ tends to µ, there is a nonnegative real number ´ such that [µ;µ +´] has
positive measure and, for all µ 2 [µ;µ + ´] \ £ ,
U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) ¡ U(0;0;µ) ¸ K=2 > 0:
29By (iii), there is a µ0 2 [µ;µ +´]\£ with (x(µ0)¡t(µ0);t(µ0)) ¸ 0, so U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ)¡
U(0;0;µ) is increasing in µ. Combine this fact with (IC) to conclude that
U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) ¡ U(0;0;µ) ¸ U(x(µ
0);t(µ
0);µ) ¡ U(0;0;µ) ¸ K=2 > 0
for all µ 2 (µ + ´; ¹ µ] \ £, so U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) ¡ U(0;0;µ) ¸ K=2 > 0 for all µ 2 £. Now
change the menu to reduce the utility of each type by K=2 in each state. Both (P) and
(IC) continue to hold, but pro¯t increases.
(v) Full Insurance at the Top. We show that the essential supremum of x(¢) is `.
Suppose that it is not ` for some feasible menu (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£. By (ii), wlog, it must
be less than `. We show that pro¯t rises if we pool all `su±ciently' high types at full
insurance.
For each " 2 (0; ¹ µ ¡ µ), let µ" be the smallest number in (the positive measure set)
[¹ µ ¡ "; ¹ µ] \ £. Let ¿" be the premium for full insurance that leaves type-µ" indi®erent
between (`;¿") and (x(µ");t(µ")):
U(`;¿";µ") = U(x(µ");t(µ");µ"):
By Lemma 4 we have lim"!0 ¿" = ¿0, and ¿0 solves U(`;¿0;µ) = U(x(µ);t(µ);µ).
We now show that there is an " 2 (0; ¹ µ¡µ) with ¿"¡µ` > t(µ)¡µx(µ) for every type
µ ¸ ¹ µ¡". Suppose to the contrary that, for all " 2 (0; ¹ µ¡µ), there is a type µ(") ¸ ¹ µ¡"
such that
t(µ(")) ¡ µ(")x(µ(")) ¸ ¿" ¡ µ(")`: (27)
By Lemma 1, monotonicity, and x < `, we have that
¿0 ¡ µ(")` > t(¹ µ) ¡ µ(")x(¹ µ) ¸ t(µ(")) ¡ µ(")x(µ(")); (28)
since pro¯t rises if µ(") gets the contract o®ered to type ¹ µ, and rises even more if µ(")
gets (¿0;`). Letting " go to zero in (27) and (28) yields ¿0 ¡ ¹ µ` > ¿0 ¡ ¹ µ`.24 So for some
" 2 (0; ¹ µ ¡ µ), ¿" ¡ µ` > t(µ) ¡ µx(µ) for every type µ ¸ ¹ µ.
24Note that µ < 1 implies that the ¯rst inequality in (28) remains strict in the limit as " goes to zero.
30Fix such an " and consider the following menu (^ x(µ);^ t(µ))µ2£: for µ 2 [¹ µ ¡ "; ¹ µ] \ £,
set ^ x(µ) = ` and ^ t(µ) = ¿"; otherwise set (^ x(µ);^ t(µ)) = (x(µ);t(µ)): This menu satis¯es
(IC) and (P) and has higher pro¯t than (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£.
(vi) No Pooling at the Top. Suppose that the set of types below ¹ µ receiving full
coverage is of positive measure for some feasible menu (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£. Let ^ µ be the
in¯mum of this set. We shall show that there is an alternative menu with higher pro¯t.
By (IC), any type with full insurance is charged the same premium, call it ¿. Since
the menu is monotone and x · `, we have x(µ) < ` if µ < ^ µ and x(µ) = ` if µ > ^ µ. By
Lemma 4, limµ!^ µ U(x(µ);t(µ);µ) = U(`;¿; ^ µ). Wlog, we can set x(^ µ) = ` and t(^ µ) = ¿,
since expected pro¯t does not fall and (IC) and (P) still hold.
Fix " 2 (0; ¹ µ¡^ µ). Let ¿(") be the largest premium satisfying (P) for loss chance ^ µ+"
at full insurance: U(`;¿("); ^ µ + ") = U(0;0; ^ µ + ").25 For each ± 2 (0;¿(")) let (x±;t±)
be the contract that leaves type ^ µ indi®erent between (`;¿) and (x±;t±), and type ^ µ + "
indi®erent between (`;¿ + ±) and (x±;t±). Formally, (x±;t±) solves (see Figure 4)
U(`;¿; ^ µ) = U(x±;t±; ^ µ)
U(`;¿ + ±; ^ µ + ") = U(x±;t±; ^ µ + ")
De¯ne a menu of contracts (^ x(µ);^ t(µ))µ2£ as follows: (^ x(µ);^ t(µ)) = (`;¿ + ±) if µ 2
(^ µ+";µ]\£; (^ x(µ);^ t(µ)) = (x±;t±) if µ 2 [^ µ; ^ µ+"]\£; and (^ x(µ);^ t(µ)) = (~ x±(µ);~ t±(µ)) if
µ 2 [µ; ^ µ)\£, where (~ x±(µ);~ t±(µ)) is equal to the best of the two contracts (x(µ);t(µ)) or
(x±;t±) for type µ. The menu (^ x(µ);^ t(µ))µ2£ satis¯es (IC) and (P) for every ± 2 (0;¿(")),
and its expected pro¯t is
Z
(^ µ+";µ]
[¿ + ± ¡ µ`]dF(µ) +
Z
[^ µ;^ µ+"]
[t± ¡ µx±]dF(µ) +
Z
[µ;^ µ)
[~ t±(µ) ¡ µ~ x±(µ)]dF(µ): (29)
We now show that each of the three expressions is di®erentiable in ± at ± = 0 and that,
for small enough " > 0, the derivative of the sum is positive.
The derivative of the ¯rst term at ± = 0 is
R
(^ µ+";µ] dF(µ) > 0 for every " 2 [0; ¹ µ ¡ ^ µ).











Figure 4: No pooling at the top
Since u is C1, x± and t± are di®erentiable in ± for every ± 2 [0;¿), t0
± ¡µx0
± is bounded
on [0;¿)££, and tedious algebra reveals that t0
0 ¡µx0
0 = (^ µ¡µ)=" · 0 for µ 2 [^ µ; ^ µ+"].





" dF(µ) · 0. By the mean-value theorem, for every " 2 (0; ¹ µ ¡ ^ µ), there




^ µ ¡ µ
"
dF(µ) =
^ µ ¡ Ã(")
"
³
F(^ µ + ") ¡ F(^ µ)
´
¸ F(^ µ) ¡ F(^ µ + "):
Since F(¢) is right-continuous, the last expression tends to zero as " tends to zero.
Finally, consider the third integral in (29). The integrand is di®erentiable in ± at
± = 0 and it is easy to show that the value of the derivative is zero for every µ 2
£ \ [µ; ^ µ). Moreover, since x± and t± are decreasing in ±, it follows that, for each
(±;µ) 2 (0;¿(")) £
³




± j · j
x±¡x0
± j and j
~ t±(µ)¡t(µ)
± j · j
t±¡t0
± j, which
shows that the derivatives of x± and t± are bounded on [0;w ¡ ¿]. Hence, the third
integral is di®erentiable at ± = 0 and the derivative equals zero for every " 2 [0; ¹ µ ¡ ^ µ)
. Since the derivative of (29) with respect to ± is positive for some " > 0, the original
menu is not optimal.
32(vii) The Principal Makes Positive Profit. Let " > 0, and consider a menu in
which each type chooses either (0;0) or (`;µ`+") to maximize expected utility. Clearly,
expected pro¯t is positive from any type who chooses (`;µ` + "). Since ¹ µ < 1, for " > 0
small enough, we have that µ` + " < `, so a positive measure of types in [µ; ¹ µ] choose
(`;µ` + ") and expected pro¯t from this menu is positive. ¥
A.2 Proof of Continuous Di®erentiability of U(µ)
If f(¢) is continuous on £ = [µ;µ] and positive on (µ;µ), then U(¢) is C1 on (µ;µ). We
prove this fact in three steps.
No Indifference at an Optimal Menu. We ¯rst show that if (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£
is optimal, then each type strictly prefers its contract to any other one in the menu.
Consider a feasible menu (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ violating this property: for two types µ0, µ00 in
£ we have (x(µ00);t(µ00)) 6= (x(µ0);t(µ0)) and U(µ00) = U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ00). We will show
that there is a feasible menu with higher expected pro¯t.
There are two cases to consider: (i) µ00 > µ0; and (ii) µ0 > µ00.
Consider case (i). The single-crossing property and (IC) imply that types in (µ0;µ00)
are pooled at (x(µ0);t(µ0)) (each type prefers (x(µ0);t(µ0)) to (x(µ00);t(µ00)), and any other
distinct contract that a type µ 2 (µ0;µ00) likes as least as much as (x(µ0);t(µ0)) will be
envied by either µ0 or µ00). For any " 2 (0;µ00 ¡µ0), give all types in [µ0 +";µ00) a contract
(x(µ0) + ±;¿±) satisfying ± 2 (0;x(µ00) ¡ x(µ0)) and U(x(µ0) + ±;¿±;µ00) = U(µ00); and give
types in [µ0;µ0 + ") a contract (x(µ0) + d±;p±) satisfying the following equations:
U(x(µ
0) + d±;p±;µ







Leave the contract for every other type unchanged. The new menu satis¯es (IC) and










33Each of the functions ¿±, p±, and d± are continuously di®erentiable in ± with derivatives
uniformly bounded on (0;x(µ00) ¡ x(µ0)) £ [µ0;µ00]. Hence the change in expected pro¯t













As " ! 0, the second term vanishes, while the ¯rst tends to
R
[µ0;µ00)[¿0
0 ¡ µ]dF(µ), which
is positive by Lemma 1, so the original menu (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ cannot be optimal.
Now consider case (ii). As in case (i) any types in (µ00;µ0) are pooled at (x(µ0);t(µ0)).
Let " 2 (0;µ0 ¡ µ00). For each type in [µ00 + ";µ], consider a new contract that lowers
the utility in each state by ± > 0 satisfying U(µ00 + ") ¡ ± > U(x(µ0);t(µ0);µ00 + "). Give
types in (µ0;µ0 + ") the contract at the intersection of the indi®erence set of type µ0
(through (x(µ0);t(µ0))) and type µ00 + " (through the new contract for it). The contract
remains the same for all other types. By the single crossing property and feasibility of
(x(µ);t(µ))µ2£, the new menu satis¯es (P) and (IC). Moreover, on the set (µ00 + ";µ],
expected pro¯t rises and has a positive derivative with respect to ± at ± = 0 for every
" 2 [0;µ0 ¡ µ00). As in case (i), the derivative of expected pro¯t conditional on the
complement of types wrt ± at ± = 0 tends to zero as " tends to zero. Since (µ00;µ] =
[">0[µ00+";µ], (µ00;µ0) ½ (µ00;µ], and by hypothesis (µ00;µ0) is of positive measure, we have
that for some " 2 (0;µ0 ¡ µ00), expected pro¯t from the new (feasible) menu is greater
than expected pro¯t from (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£.
U(¢) is Differentiable. Let (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£ be an optimal menu. Since for any
(Â;¿), U(Â;¿;¢) is di®erentiable on £, and since, for each µ 2 £ = [µ;µ], the contract
in fx(µ0);t(µ0)jµ0 2 £g which maximizes U(¢;¢;µ) is unique, it follows from the Envelope
Theorem (Milgrom and Segal (2002), Theorem 3) that U0(µ) exists and equals ¡¢(µ) .
U(¢) is Continuously Differentiable. Since U(Â;¿;¢) is a±ne in µ, the indirect
utility U(¢) is convex. Since U(¢) is also di®erentiable it follows from Rockafellar (1970)
(Corollary 25.5.1) that it is C1 on (µ;µ). ¥
34A.3 Proof of Lemma 2 (Complete Sorting)





















and ¸(µ) · 0, it follows that _ ¢(µ) · 0 if and only if
f0(µ)
f(µ)
µ(1 ¡ µ) + (2 ¡ 3µ) +
h0(U(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¢(µ))






3µ ¡ 2 ¡ b(µ)
µ(1 ¡ µ)
;
where b(µ) = h0(U(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¢(µ))=[h0(U(µ) + µ¢(µ)) ¡ h0(U(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¢(µ))]. ¥
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3 (Complete Sorting: Su±ciency)










Fix ^ µ 2 [µ; ¹ µ). We ¯rst claim that if _ ¢(¿) < 0 for all ¿ 2 (^ µ; ¹ µ), and condition (30) holds,
then _ ¢(^ µ) < 0. To establish this claim, we show that
b(^ µ) > ¡1 +
f(^ µ)
1 ¡ F(^ µ)
^ µ(1 ¡ ^ µ); (31)
implying that the su±cient (and necessary) condition (18) holds at ^ µ.
Let h0
n(µ) = h0(U(µ) ¡ µ¢(µ)). Since _ ¢(¿) < 0 and f(¿) > 0 for all ¿ 2 (^ µ; ¹ µ),
f(¿)h
0
n(^ µ) > f(¿)h
0
n(¿) > f(¿)a(¿); (32)
35for all ¿ 2 (^ µ; ¹ µ), with equalities at ¹ µ, where a(¢) is de¯ned in equation (16).










^ µ(1 ¡ ^ µ)f(^ µ);
1 ¡ F(^ µ)
(33)
where (¢h)0(µ) = h0(U(µ) + µ¢(µ)) ¡ h0(U(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¢(µ)) and we have used (16).
Add ¡^ µ(¢h)0(^ µ) to both sides of (33) and rearrange to get (31), so that the su±cient
condition (18) holds at ^ µ.
It now follows that, under condition (30), _ ¢(µ) < 0 for all µ 2 £ : if _ ¢ ¸ 0
somewhere, then there would be a largest µ 2 [µ; ¹ µ) with _ ¢(µ) ¸ 0 (since _ ¢(¢) is
continuous and limsupµ!¹ µ _ ¢(µ) < 0). By the claim, condition (30) would fail.
(ii) Let f0(¢)=f(¢) be decreasing and suppose that sorting is not complete: _ ¢(µ) ¸ 0
for some µ. We will show that µ ¸ 1=2 and that f0 is sometimes negative.
Since limsupµ!¹ µ _ ¢(µ) < 0 and _ ¢ is continuous on (µ;µ), there is a largest type ^ µ 2 £
with _ ¢(^ µ) = 0. In addition _ ¢(µ) < 0 for all µ 2 (^ µ; ¹ µ).
From Lemma 3 the sign of ¡ _ ¢(¢) is the same as
g(µ) = f
0(µ)=f(µ) ¡ (3µ ¡ 2 ¡ b(µ))=µ(1 ¡ µ): (34)
Moreover,
b












so that b0(^ µ) = 0. Since _ ¢(µ) < 0 for all µ > ^ µ, and g(^ µ) = 0, we must have g0(^ µ) ¸ 0.
Since f0=f is decreasing, the second fraction cannot be increasing at ^ µ. But
@
@µ
3µ ¡ 2 ¡ b(µ)
µ(1 ¡ µ)
=
µ(1 ¡ µ)[3 ¡ b0(µ)] + (1 ¡ 2µ)(3µ ¡ 2 ¡ b(µ))
µ2(1 ¡ µ)2 :
Since b0(^ µ) = 0 and b(µ) > 0, g0(^ µ) ¸ 0 implies that ^ µ > 1=2, so ¹ µ > 1=2.
To show that f0(¢) must sometimes be negative, rewrite (34) as ~ g(µ) = (1¡µ)g(µ) =
(1¡µ)(f0(µ)=f(µ))¡(3µ¡2¡b(µ))=µ. Since _ ¢(µ) < 0 for all µ > ^ µ, and ~ g(^ µ) = 0 , we must
have ~ g0(^ µ) ¸ 0. But since b0(^ µ) = 0, the fraction (3µ ¡ 2 ¡ b(µ))=µ is strictly increasing
in a neighborhood of ^ µ, so (1 ¡ µ)f0(µ)=f(µ) must be increasing in a neighborhood of ^ µ,
36so f0(¢) is negative on a neighborhood of ^ µ. ¥
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2 (No Exclusion)
Type µ is not excluded from the optimal menu of contracts if ¢(~ µ) > ¢0. From equation
(16) and the concavity of the optimal control problem, this is tantamount to showing
that the marginal bene¯t of providing insurance to ~ µ starting from no insurance is bigger
than the marginal cost of doing so. Formally,
f(µ)µ(1 ¡ µ)[h
0(u(w)) ¡ h




Assume ¯rst that ¡u000(¢)=u00(¢) < ¡3u00(¢)=u0(¢). It is easy to show that in this case
a0(¢) < 0. Hence,
R µ
µ a(s)f(s)ds < a(µ), and (36) holds if f(µ)µ(1¡µ)[h0(u(w))¡h0(u(w¡
`))] > a(µ): Since a(µ) < (1 ¡ µ)h0(u(w)) + µh0(u(w ¡ `)), it follows that
f(µ)µ(1 ¡ µ)[h
0(u(w)) ¡ h
0(u(w ¡ `))] > (1 ¡ µ)h
0(u(w)) + µh
0(u(w ¡ `));
which is equivalent to
f(µ) >
(1 ¡ µ)h0(u(w)) + µh0(u(w ¡ `))
µ(1 ¡ µ)[h0(u(w)) ¡ h0(u(w ¡ `))]
: (37)
Thus, type µ is not excluded from the optimal menu if f(µ) is larger than the right side
of (37). But Theorem 3 (i) or (ii) imply that µ(1¡µ)f(µ)=(1¡F(µ)) is increasing in µ,
showing that no µ ¸ µ will be excluded from the optimal menu of contracts.
Without imposing ¡u000(¢)=u00(¢) < ¡3u00(¢)=u0(¢), a stronger su±cient condition holds,
with the numerator on the right side of (37) replaced by h0(u(w)). ¥
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3 (Exclusion)
Type ~ µ is excluded from the optimal menu of contracts if ¢(~ µ) = ¢0. From equation
(16), we must show that the marginal bene¯t of providing insurance to ~ µ starting from
37no insurance is less than the marginal cost of doing so. Formally,
f(~ µ)~ µ(1 ¡ ~ µ)[h
0(u(w)) ¡ h




Assume ¯rst that ¡u000(¢)=u00(¢) < ¡3u00(¢)=u0(¢). In this case,
R µ
~ µ a(s)f(s)ds > a(µ)(1 ¡
F(~ µ)), and (38) holds if f(~ µ)~ µ(1 ¡ ~ µ)[h0(u(w)) ¡ h0(u(w ¡ `))] < a(µ)(1 ¡ F(~ µ)). Since
a(µ) = h0(U(µ)) ¸ h0((1¡µ)u(w)+µu(w¡`)), type ~ µ is excluded from the optimal menu
if
f(~ µ)
(1 ¡ F(~ µ))
<
h0((1 ¡ µ)u(w) + µu(w ¡ `))
~ µ(1 ¡ ~ µ)[h0(u(w)) ¡ h0(u(w ¡ `))]
: (39)
But Theorem 3 (i) or (ii) implies that µ(1 ¡ µ)f(µ)=(1 ¡ F(µ)) is increasing in µ, which
shows that any µ · ~ µ will be excluded from the optimal menu of contracts as well.
Without imposing ¡u000(¢)=u00(¢) < ¡3u00(¢)=u0(¢), a similar, but stronger, su±cient
condition for exclusion holds, with the numerator of (39) replaced by h0(u(w ¡ `)). ¥
A.7 Proof of Lemma 3 (Curvature)
Let (U(µ);¢(µ)) solve the optimal control problem with _ ¢(¢) < 0 everywhere. Since
u(µ) = U(µ)+µ¢(µ) for all µ, we can use (5)-(6) to recover the optimal menu (x(µ);t(µ))µ2£.
Recall that _ U(µ) = ¡¢(µ), so _ u(µ) = µ _ ¢(µ). Di®erentiate (5)-(6) to get




_ x(µ) = ¡
_ ¢(µ)[(1 ¡ µ)u0(w ¡ t(µ)) + µu0(w ¡ ` + x(µ) ¡ t(µ))]
u0(w ¡ ` + x(µ) ¡ t(µ))u0(w ¡ t(µ))
; (41)
where we have used u(µ) = u(w ¡ t(µ)) and h0(¢) = 1=u0(h(¢)).
Since (by assumption) sorting is complete, we have _ x(¢) > 0, so the inverse of x(¢),
call it z(¢), is well de¯ned (i.e., µ = z(x)). We can now represent the optimal mechanism
as a nonlinear premium schedule T(x) = t(z(x)). Then, (40)-(41) and µ = z(x) give




µu0(w ¡ ` + x(µ) ¡ t(µ))
(1 ¡ µ)u0(w ¡ t(µ)) + µu0(w ¡ ` + x(µ) ¡ t(µ))
: (42)































Insert (40)-(41) into (43) and manipulate the resulting expression to reveal that Ä T(x) < 0














. Use h0 = 1=u0, h00 = u00=u03, and




















where ­ = µ(1 ¡ µ)
f0
f + 1 ¡ 2µ and E[ 1
u0] = µ(1=u0
`) + (1 ¡ µ)(1=u0
n). Now ¯nd that































































and the entire right side simpli¯es to µ ¡ 1 + c(µ). Rearrange to get the result. ¥
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